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Acceptable Risk:
A Conceptual Proposal*
Baruch Fischhoff**
Introduction
The Search for Acceptability
Perhaps the most widely sought quantity in the management of
hazardous technologies is the acceptable level of risk.1 Technologies
whose risks fall below that level could go about their business, without
worrying further about the risks that they impose on others. Riskier
technologies would face closure if they could not be brought into
compliance. For designers and operators, having a well-defined
acceptable level of risk would provide a clear target for managing their
technology. For regulators, identifying an acceptable level of risk would
mean resolving value issues at the time that standards are set, allowing
an agency's technical staff to monitor compliance mechanically,
without having to make case-specific political and ethical decisions. For
*
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1 Howard I. Adler & Alvin M. Weinberg, An Approach to Setting Radiation
Standards, 34 Health Phys. 719 (1978); James 0. Corbett, Risk Assessment
Criteriafor Radioactive Waste Disposal, 8 RiskAnal. 575 (1988); Health & Safety
Executive, The Tolerability of Risks from Nuclear Power Stations, (London 1987);
William R. Lowrance, Of Acceptable Risk (1976); Paul Milvy, A General Guideline
for Management of Risk from Carcinogens,6 RiskAnal. 67 (1986); Chauncey Starr,
Risk Criteriafor Nuclear Power Plants: A Pragmatic Proposal, 1 Risk Anal. 113
(1981); and Chauncey Starr, Risk Management Assessment and Acceptability, 5 Risk
Anal. 97 (1985).
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the public, a clearly enunciated acceptable level of risk would provide a
concise focus for evaluating how well its welfare is being protected saving it from having to understand the details of the technical
processes creating those risks.
A recent example is the attempt by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA)2 to cope with a case involving vinyl chloride. 3 EPA
interpreted that case to require it, first, to assess the health risks for
emissions of a particular pollutant and, second, to determine an
acceptable risk for a source category emitting that pollutant. 4 An
earlier example is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's 5 attempt to
set the overall level of safety expected for nuclear power plants. 6 Both
are still in process, and it is premature to judge their outcomes.
Yet, an ominous sign may be found in an EPA study done to
prepare for dealing with the vinyl chloride case. It "surveyed a range of
health risks that our society faces" and reviewed acceptable-risk
standards of government and independent institutions. 7 This led
EPA to find that "No fixed level of risk could be identified as accept8
able in all cases and under all regulatory programs...," and that:
... the acceptability of risk is a relative concept and
involves consideration of different factors.
Considerations in these judgments may include: The
certainty and severity of the risk; the reversibility of the
2 Environmental Protection Agency, National Emission Standards for Hazardous
Air Pollutants..., 53 Fed. Reg. 28,495 (1988).
3 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
4
55 Fed. Reg., at 28512-513.
5 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Safety Goals for Nuclear Power Plants
(NUREG-0880 1982).
6 See, e.g., Vickie M. Bier, The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Safet
Goal Policy: A Critical Review, 8 Risk Anal. 563 (1988); Baruch Fischhof,
Acceptable Risk: The Case of Nuclear Power, 2 J. Pol'y Anal. & Mgmt. 559 (1983);
J. Michael Griesmeyer & David Okrent, Risk Management and Decision Rules for
Light Water Reactors, 1 RiskAnal. 121 (1981); Kenneth A. Solomon et al., An
Evaluation ofAlternative Safety Criteriafor Nuclear Power Plants, 5 RiskAnal. 209
(1985).
7 Survey of Risks (Dkt. No. OAQPS 79-3. Part I, Dkt. item X-B-1).
8 53 Fed. Reg., at 28,513.
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health effect; the knowledge or familiarity of the risk;
whether the risk is voluntarily accepted or involuntarily
imposed; whether individuals are compensated for their
exposure to the risk; the advantages of the activity; and
the risks and advantages for any aternatives.
To regulate a technology in a logically defensible way, one must
consider all its consequences, i.e., both risks and benefits. To regulate in
an ethically defensible way, one must consider its impact on
individuals, as well as on society as a whole.
An analytical procedure is advanced here to meet these constraints
in determining the acceptability of technologies, one that is consistent
with court decisions and compatible with general public values. The
next section formulates this concept more precisely. It is followed by a
discussion of how it could be implemented procedurally and describes
modest compromises to the absolute principle to make it practicable.
Embedded in an acceptable political process, the suggested procedure
would offer some chance of making the regulation of hazardous
technologies more predictable and satisfying. Along these lines, the
final part of the paper speculates on how this procedure would affect
the fate of particular technologies.
In an essay such as this, it is impossible to work out all the details;
the proposal should be judged by whether the concept makes sense and
whether its implementation seems workable. It should be appraised in
absolute terms: How well could it ever work? What degree of closure
would it provide? It should also be considered relatively (recognizing
the opportunities competing approaches have had to be proven or
discredited): How does it compare to what we have?
This proposal tries to implement the non-utilitarian principle that a
technology must provide acceptable consequences for everyone affected
by it. Pursuing it as far as possible should produce a better regulatory
process than current approaches - ones focused on other ethical
principles (or no explicit principles at all).
If the proposal is attractive, then one might undertake the chore of
working out its details. That would involve some daunting challenges,
e.g., estimating the scientific uncertainty regarding the magnitude of a
5 Risk Health, Safety &Environment 1 [Wimter 1994]

technology's risks and eliciting citizens' willingness to trade off diverse
costs and benefits.
It will be argued here that such obstacles are a sign of strength
rather than weakness. They are inherent in analytically defining
acceptable risk and revealed most clearly by an approach that attempts
to address them head on. Short cuts can have both direct costs (e.g.,
antagonizing those whose issues are ignored) and opportunity costs
(e.g., keeping scientists from working on neglected issues).
A final proviso is that the proposal would provide an incomplete
path to regulatory reform even if all its methodological problems were
solved. An analytical principle for evaluating the acceptability of
technologies may become a point of departure for struggles, possibly
involving suits, lobbying, hearings, demonstrations and negotiations. An
analytical approach to acceptability can only hope to forestall some
conflicts, by identifying politically unacceptable solutions, and focus
others, by concentrating attention on critical unresolved issues.
However attractive its logic, an analytical approach will aggravate
controversy if offered as a substitute for an acceptable political process.
People quite legitimately care as much about how decisions are made
9
as what decisions are made.
A Proposal for Acceptability: Balancing Risks and Benefits
As EPA has noted, the acceptability of a risk depends on many
factors. In their everyday lives, people do not accept or reject risks in
isolation. Rather, they make choices among courses of actions, whose
consequences may include risks. If people accept a course of action, like
deciding to drive somewhere, despite knowing about risks, then those
9

See, e.g., Daniel J. Fiorino, Regulatory Negotiation as a Policy Process, 48 Pub.

Adm. Rev. 764 (1988); Daniel J. Fiorino, Citizen Participationand Environmental

Risk, 15 Sci. Tech. & Human Values 226 (1990); Sheldon Krimsky & Alonzo
Plough, Environmental Hazards: Communicating Risks as a. Social Process (1988);

Controversy. Politics of Technical Decisions (Dorothy Nelkin ed. 1978); Harry J.

Otway & Detlof von Winterfeldt, Beyond Acceptable Risk: On the Social

Acceptability of Technologies, 14 Pol'y Sci. 247 (1982); Lillie C. Trimble, What Do
Citizens Want in the Siting of Waste Management Facilities? 8 Risk Anal. 375
(1988); and Elaine Vaughn, Individual and Cultural Differences in Adaptation to
Environmental Risks, 48 Am. Psych. 673 (1993).

Fischhoffi Acceptable Risk A Conceptual Proposal 5

risks might be termed acceptable in the context of the other
consequences of that action. They need not be acceptable in any
absolute sense. Those same individuals might choose a riskier course of
action (e.g., deciding to pass a slow car), if it brought a compensating
benefit. Or, they might choose a less risky course of action (e.g.,
postponing a trip home until well after the bars close), if that could be
done at reasonable cost. A level of risk that is acceptable for one activity
might seem horrendously high or wonderfully low in other contexts. In
ordinary discourse, it is so easy to lose the essential context of clecisions
that the term "acceptable level of risk" might best be avoided. 10
In this light, a technology should be acceptable to an individual if it
creates an acceptable balance of personal risks and benefits. If a
technology is acceptable for each member of society, then it should be
satisfactory to society as a whole. One might call the risks of that
technology societally acceptable (considering its benefits), just as one
might call its benefits societally acceptable (considering its risks). A
focus on action may produce the best language, that of a societally
acceptable technology. This is the definition being advocated here; A

technology has a societally acceptable level of risk if its benefits
11
outweigh its risks for every member of society.
The ethical core of this proposal may be seen most sharply by
contrasting it with the utilitarianism of approaches that look at the total
benefits accruing to a society from a technology, when judging the
acceptability of its risks. A rough method for doing so is to perform a
cost-benefit analysis, summarizing economic measures of a technology's
10 The (UK) Health & Safety Executive, supra note 1, uses the term "tolerable" to

describe risks that are accepted for the time being, until a more attractive tradeoff can
be found. See also, Baruch Fischhoff et al., Acceptable Risk (1981).
11 There is no reason why these "benefits" should be restricted to economic
consequences or even noneconomic ones for which putative economic equivalents
exist. People could in principle, be compensated by peace of mind, feelings of
satisfaction, or reduction of other risks. See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff & Louis A. Cox.,
Jr., Conceptual Framework for Benefit Assessment in Benefits Assessment: The State
of the Art (Judith D. Bentkover, Vincent T. Covello & Jeryl Mumpower eds. 1985);
Baruch Fischhoff & Lita Furby, Measuring Values: A Conceptual Framework for
Interpreting Transactions, 1 J. Risk & Uncert. 147 (1988).
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total benefits and total costs (including the risks that it imposes). A
central ethical assumption of many such analyses is that one should look
at the overall balance of consequences for society, while ignoring the
balance actually experienced by individuals. Under this assumption, one
would not care if a technology made society as a whole better off, at
the price of making some of its members miserable. Nor would one
care if a few people received very large net benefits, while many others
had small net losses; or, if many people had small net benefits, while
imposing large net losses on a few (e.g., those living near a landfill that
12
accepts hazardous wastes from a large area).
The rationale for this indifference to the fate of individuals is often
some variant on the potential Pareto improvement principle. It holds
that an action is acceptable if its excess of benefits over risks is
sufficiently great that those who "win" from the action could
compensate losers. However, they need not do so. The losers in these
transactions may not know, much less be persuaded by, the efficiency
arguments supporting this principle. Nor may they see themselves as
winners often enough, in the set of decisions resolved by these
procedures, to overlook the apparent injustices of a particular decision.
Rather than trusting to any long run, they may want to be compensated
in every transaction. It would take only a mildly cynical view of how
society distributes its wealth to justify a fear of routinely getting the
13
short end of the stick.
12 The controversial nature of such aggregate analyses may be seen in the conflict
between Executive Order 12,291, see, e.g., Fischhoff & Cox, supra note 11 and the

Court's opinion in the vinyl chloride case, supra note 3. The former requires costbenefit analyses, examining the overall impact of significant federal regulatory actions,
ignoring which individuals get the costs and which get the benefits. The latter
prohibits EPA from considering the cost or feasibility of compliance in setting the
acceptable level of risk, thereby ignoring the benefits that less costly operation might
bring to society as a whole.
See also Michael S. Baram, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Inadequate Basis for
Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulatory Decision Making, 8 Ecol. L.Q. 473
(1980); John T. Campen, Benefit, Cost & Beyond (1986); David W. Pearce, Cost

Benefit Analysis (1983); Elizabeth Stokey & Richard Zekhauser, A Primer for Policy
Analysis (1978).
13 See, e.g., Robert Bullard, Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and Environmental
Quality (1990) and Commission for Racial Justice, Toxic Wastes and Race in the

United States (1987).
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Concern for the fate of individuals is embodied in regulations, like
those reviewed by EPA, that specify acceptable levels of individual risk.
For example, the maximum risk to someone living 70 years at a plant
boundary might be set at one chance in a million of dying from a
particular kind of emission. These regulations do not, however, invoke
the benefits to these individuals as a concern in setting risk levels.
Conceivably, some notion of benefit may underlie the standards.
However, as long as they are not mentioned specifically, one cannot
evaluate the appropriateness of the tradeoffs created by these standards.
Indeed, the standards seem to deny the existence of tradeoffs. They do
not distinguish, for example, between the situation of a middle-aged
worker at the plant, who voluntarily lives near the gate to use cheap
housing and avoid a nerve-racking commute, and that of a child whose
parents could not afford to move when the plant set up shop next door.
No reasonable individual would want his or her personal life to be
governed by a rigid acceptable level of risk. Nor should a reasonable
society want a single level of risk to govern all technologies, regardless
of their other features, including the benefits that they bring.
Furthermore, reasonable individuals should not want government to
take such inflexible actions on their behalf. It is not logically defensible
to set a single level of acceptable risk for all technologies, unless a
principled decision has been made to ignore all other factors. Had
EPA's survey found that agencies make the same demands of diverse
technologies, it would have provided a serious indictment of our
regulatory processes.
Thus, again, the present proposal is that a technology is acceptable

if it creates acceptable risk-benefit tradeoffi for every member of
society. This criterion is advanced as a general political-ethical
principle of the sort that would be endorsed by most citizens as a
fundamental regulatory philosophy. It allows risks to be balanced by
benefits, but protects individuals in cases where the greatest good for
the greatest number might come at their expense.
If this proposal appears ethically sound, then the critical question
becomes whether it can be implemented. Doing so would require: a
5 Risk Health, Safety &Environment I [Winter 1994]

fuller definition of "acceptable tradeoffs," a credible means for
measuring those tradeoffs and an orderly procedure for applying them
to evaluating individual technologies. Subsequent sections discuss these
topics in turn, suggesting a work plan for developing practical standards
from this conceptual proposal. A final section considers how
implementing that plan would affect various stakeholders: industries,
regulatory agencies, members of the public, and public interest
organizations. It concludes that putting the fate of individual citizens at
the center of the regulatory process may actually make life easier for
many technologies.
As mentioned, in a democratic society, analysis cannot replace
process, only inform it. However, a sound analysis can create a
disputable presumption regarding what the outcome of that process
should be. A technology that failed this test would bear an extra
burden, either to create better tradeoffs for the individuals it affects or
to demonstrate why it deserves special dispensation. Citizens opposed
to a technology that had passed this test would bear an extra burden of
proof to argue why it should pass more rigorous standards. People
opposed to an analytical result will, naturally, criticize its technical
details. However, that should be much less frustrating than trying to
get the details right for an analysis that itself made no sense.
The goal of this proposal is not to enshrine and defend a single
absolutist principle. Rather, it attempts to create a workable
compromise. It qualifies and elaborates the core concept in ways that
preserve and refine its basic thrust, in the hopes that it will resolve many
issues (to the point where they do not seem worthy of debate) and
focus debate on the others. It aims at fewer, but better conflicts.
Defining Acceptable Technologies
Conceptually, the most straightforward approach to determining
the acceptability of a particular technology is simply asking all relevant
citizens whether they are satisfied with how it affects them personally.
The present section analyzes the reasons why such direct assessment is
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not viable. It argues, in effect, that, although the present proposal is for
the people, it cannot be by the people - at least not in this fully
democratic sense. This discussion leads to a refined statement of the
4
acceptable technology principle.1
SamplingLimitations
Vast numbers of people are exposed to at least some risk from
many technologies. Indeed, where atmospheric distribution of toxins is
possible, every person on the planet may be exposed. Given the
intensive interviewing needed to elicit informed judgments regarding
risk-benefit tradeoffs, 1 5 it is impossible to ask everyone about
everything. Thus, the most that can be elicited is general guidance
regarding the kinds of tradeoffs most people would accept - were
they asked in a way that allowed them to understand the risks, the
benefits and their own attitudes toward the tradeoffs.
Such direct evidence of concern is also the least that can be obtained
if public welfare is to be at the center of regulatory processes. For
example, one cannot rely on risk professionals' speculations regarding
"what the public wants." The limits to expert opinions can be seen in
disagreements among them about that. 1 6 Professionals contact the
public so irregularly, and their life experiences are so different, that they
cannot claim accurate knowledge. Also, there is too much opportunity
14 Whether (and how) public opinion needs to be consulted regarding the adoption
of a specific standards is, of course, also a matter of administrative procedure and law.
For example, the Court's opinion of the Vinyl Chloride case appears to call for the
adoption of a standard that the general public would endorse, were it possible to
solicit its collective opinion in a way that ensured full understanding cf the standards
and their implications. EPA's request for comments on its proposed approaches
repeatedly mentions concern for the public's desires. Many regulatory procedures call
for public hearings, followed by orderly written responses to questions raised in them.
The present proposal is intended to comply with these constraints, and perhaps give
them structure. Detailed analyses of particular settings must await a future
opportunity.
15 See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff, Value Elicitation: Is There Anything in There? 46
Am. Psych. 835 (1991) and Ralph L. Keeney & Howard Raiffa, Decisions with
Multiple Objectives (1976).
16 See, e.g., National Research Council, Risk Perception and Communication
(1989); Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 Science 280 (1987); Vaughn, supra note
9; and Abraham H. Wandersman & William K. Hallman, Are People Acting
Rationally?48 Am. Psych. 681 (1993).
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to report "what I think I would want were I in the public's place" or
even "what I would like the public to want." Analogous criticisms limit
the value of other potential stand-ins for genuine citizens (e.g., public
interest advocates, elected representatives, pundits), although citizens
might wish to consider such opinions when deciding which tradeoffs
are right for them.
Thus, acceptable tradeoffs must be ones that citizens endorse in
principle. They cannot want to be asked to evaluate their fate at the
hands of every single technology, much less every change in its
operating procedures. Being forced to have an opinion on every
problem would mean being denied the opportunity to have articulated
17
opinions on any problem.
Although one might, in principle, ask every citizen about those
general standards, a properly chosen sample should provide estimates of
any desired precision. Moreover, the queried sample deserves the
chance to develop thoughtful positions on these fateful issues and will
need more opportunities for reflection than is possible with
conventional survey research. 18 Thus, sample size might be sacrificed
for measurement accuracy, securing fewer people, but ones who really
have a basis for their opinion - not unlike the situation with common
law juries.
Complexity
The impossibility of asking everyone about everything reflects not
just the number of potential decisions but also their complexity. For
example, the money saved by not reducing a risk typically goes directly
to the risk's producer. Nonetheless, other individuals, including those
exposed to the risk, may receive indirect benefits as those cost savings
pass through the economy. When federal government facilities operate
at riskier levels, then taxes might be lower for all citizens, including
those who bear the additional risks. Similarly, allowing a privately
owned plant to operate more riskily might encourage it to remain in a
community, leave it with more capital for local investment and
17 See, e.g., Jacques Ellul, Propaganda (1969).
18 See, e.g., Fischhoff, supra note 15.
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encourage more generous wages. The ripple effects of such actions
might benefit risk-bearers who are neither employees nor stock owners.
Conversely, technologies should also be held accountable for indirect
costs created by their risks. Some may be hard to measure or of
uncertain relevance; 1 9 e.g., the anxiety caused by concern over a
landfill can have real health effects, even if rooted in
20
misunderstandings.
Identifying all of these consequences, much less quantifying them,
is not work for the timid. A "classic" example of these difficulties
might be found in the controversy over the direct and indirect risks of
energy systems, prompted by Inhaber's analysis. 2 1 Individuals might
at best hope to understand the full set of personal effects for a handful
of risky technologies for which they had a particular interest. As a
result, it is a proper regulatory function to analyze the risks and benefits
that a technology creates for individual citizens, then subject those
summary measures of acceptability to the general standards produced
22
by representative groups of ordinary citizens.

StrategicResponses
Were they asked to judge the tradeoffs associated with a specific
technology, properly informed individuals would realize that its fate
hinged on their consent. If they sought to get the best possible deal for
themselves, then they should exploit this position and demand more
benefits than they would ordinarily view as constituting adequate
19 An issue currently in litigation is whether technologies can be held liable for the
existence value of natural resources, that is, the value that people assign to the very

existence of, say, the Grand Canyon in a relatively pristine state. If the courts decided
that existence value had legal standing, then the threat that a technology posed to the
environment could become a risk requiring compensation. Measuring these threats
and the values attributed to them would be a significant methodological challenge.
20 See Andrew Baum & India Fleming, Implications of Psychological Research on
Stress and Technological Accidents, 48 Am. Psych. 665 (1993).
21 See Herbert Inhaber, Risk with Energy from Conventional and NonConventional Sources, 203 Science 718 (1979); see also John H. Herbert, C.
Swanson & P. Reddy, A Risky Business, 21(6) Environment 28 (1979).
22 Those general standards might specify, e.g., that a technology should be
responsible only for the concern that its risks would generate if they were properly
understood.
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compensation. Indeed, there would be no constraints on their demands
beyond a technology's ability to pay. Some people might like the idea
of stripping industries of all but the minimum profits needed to be
viable. Yet, doing so would involve a greater shift of political power
than is likely within any current regulatory system. 2 3 The present
proposal has the more modest goal of giving legal standing to the
welfare of all citizens, including those whose lack of political standing
might otherwise allow the imposition of unacceptable tradeoffs.,
In this approach, people are not represented directly, but through
their values, namely, the values that they would express in a situation
where they could neither exploit some artificial veto power nor be
exploited by coercive social arrangements. Such a standard would
imply some surrender of absolute sovereignty on both sides were it
implemented rigidly. A theory for justifying that restraint on individual
choice is that an orderly society needs the limited right to impose risks
in return for due compensation, just as it needs the limited right to
secure property for the public good (e.g., road building). With
declarations of eminent domain, the property is a physical object and
the compensation is determined primarily by market value. Here, the
"property' is the degree of personal safety that is lost through exposure
to a technology. Proper compensation is the level of benefit that people
would ordinarily consider to offset risks like those of the technology
absent any advantages or disadvantages in bargaining position.
-

IndividualDifferences
If asked, different people might accept very different tradeoffs.
Some may dislike risks to health and safety so much that they demand
enormous compensation in return for any exposure. They do this in
their own lives, and they expect the same treatment for risks from
technological sources. Other people may be so indifferent to such risks
that they require relatively little compensation. In their own lives, they
do little to reduce risks, even ones whose benefits are minimal.
Technological risks bother them equally little. 2 4 It would be hard for a
23 Adopting such a confiscatory policy would also raise the difficult question of how
to divide the spoils among those citizens who have preferred strategic responses.
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single regulatory policy (or a single configuration of a regulated
technology) to satisfy individuals at both extremes. Risk-avoiding
individuals would be aghast at the uncompensated riskiness of a
technology that satisfied their risk-indifferent counterparts. The latter
might be bemused at the resources "wasted" in needless risk reduction.
They might be angry if they believed that some of those resources
might otherwise come their way.
Thus, a third "compromise" of the ideal of using each affected
citizen's values for each situation is needed: Rather than having to
satisfy every possible set of values, a technology should be required to
produce acceptable sets of consequences for individuals having
"reasonable" values. This criterion is analogous to the reasonable person
standard, a routine feature of legal proceedings. It is meant to exclude
those who fall well outside the normal range. On the one hand, a
technology would not have to satisfy individuals who would do almost
anything to avoid the sort of risks that it creates. On the other hand, a
technology would get no credit for satisfying individuals who care little
25
about self protection or actually enjoy risk exposure.
Like the other principles advanced in this proposal, if this one is
accepted, then work could begin on its implementation (discussed in
greater, but still partial detail, in the following section). One possible
operational definition of "unreasonable risk avoidance" is willingly
taking actions that create risks greater than the ones that they are meant
to avoid (e.g., risking malnutrition in order to avoid foodstuffs with
minimal pesticide residues). One possible operational definition of
unreasonable risk acceptance is routinely passing up low-'(or no-) cost
opportunities to reduce risks. A fuller implementation might also
explore creating a distribution of individuals in terms of their degrees
of risk-aversiveness, then truncate symmetrically at some extreme
fractiles. Again, the focus in this essay is on developing a proposal
24

See e.g., Risk Taking (J. Frank Yates ed. 1992).

25 Such individuals derive unusual benefit from the risk, meaning that their
preferred risk-benefit tradeoffs may not be all that different from those of nonrisk
seekers.
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worthy of such detail. The act of defining "reasonable values" means
imposing a general societal standard on the individual desires that
societally regulated technologies must meet. Some individuals will be
told, in effect, that they are not entitled to as much compensation for
risk as they usually demand, while others will be getting more than they
would ordinarily expect. It is an empirical question whether the same
citizens will prove to have unreasonable values in case after case - or
26
whether different people will prove most averse to different risks.
Legitimacy ofEvaluative Criteria

In its Survey of Risks, EPA listed several conditioning factors that
might affect judgments of acceptability. Some of these seem to have
been drawn from psychologists' "psychometric" studies of risk,
initiated by Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read and Combs. 27 These
studies have found that laypeople want higher levels of safety from
technologies whose risks have certain qualitative properties, such as
being unfamiliar, evoking a feeling of dread and being perceived as
poorly understood by science. For example, a technology whose risks
were imposed involuntarily would have to provide greater benefits than
a technology with the same amount of risk, but whose adoption was
voluntary. 28 Because technologies vary on these factors, people would
29
not find any single risk level acceptable for all technologies.
26

Note that individuals who are extremely averse to risks need not be extremely

sensitive to them (a protected class in some regulations). One could respond more
acutely to a given exposure to a toxin, yet still not want particularly large
compensation particular probability of such a response.
27 See supra note 7; compare Baruch Fischhoff et al., How Safe Is Safe Enough?

A Psychometric Study of Attitudes towards Technological Risks and Benefits, 8
Pol'y Sciences 127 (1978)
28 The idea of looking for a double standard was proposed by Chauncey Starr in
Social Benefit versus Technological Risk, 165 Science 1232 (1969). A list of features

that might prompt double standards was compiled by Lowrance, supra note 1.

Further studies in this "tradition" are summarized in Robin Gregory & Robert

Mendelsohn, Perceived Risk, Dread and Benefits, 13 RiskAnal. 259 (1993); Slovic,
supra note 16; and Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff & Sarah Lichtenstein, Behavioral
Decision Theory Perspectives on Risk and Safety, 56 Acta Psych. 183 (1984).
29 See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff, Stephen Watson & Chris Hope, Defining Risk, 17
Pol'y Sciences 123 (1984).
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Whether such double standards ought to be imposed on
technologies, just because the public wants them, is a matter of
regulatory philosophy. For example, one might want greater benefits
from technologies that evoke a feeling of dread, in order to compensate
its citizens for the attendant loss in quality of life. However, one might
also believe that a technology is not responsible for how people feel
about it, even when those feelings are based on accurate risk
perceptions. One might want greater benefits from technologies whose
risks are poorly understood by science in order to encourage better
research or to create a reserve for unpleasant surprises. However, one
might also want to be neutral toward uncertainty, in order to avoid
discouraging new technologies.
The organic or enabling legislation of an agency may, however, have
no place for some of these considerations. That is, if left to their own
devices, citizens might base their acceptability judgments on factors
that have no legal relevance. As a result, citizens asked to evaluate
tradeoffs would have to be focused on factors they are allowed to
consider by an agency empowered to determine which attributes of risk
and benefit are legitimate bases for public policy. Beyond that, it would
be required to let representative citizens determine what weight, if any,
30
should be given to each.

Summary
The acceptability of a technology should depend on the
acceptability of its consequences for individual citizens. However, for
both practical and philosophical reasons, that determination cannot be
left to those citizens. There are too many issues, of too great
complexity, for citizens to be able to identify their own best interests
regarding every technology that poses some risk to them. Even if
30 Where citizens felt strongly about factors that they could not consider, then the

agency might maintain two sets of books, one for legitimate factors and one for all
factors. Over time, changes in the regulatory climate might allow the omitted factors
to be included, much as environmental effects are gradually being incorporated in
national accounts. See, e.g., Environmental Accounting for Sustainable Development
(Y.J. Ahmad, S. El Seraf! & E. Lutz eds. 1989); Ecological Economics: The Science
and Management of Sustainabilty (Robert Constanza ed. 1991); and Robert Solow,
An Almost Practical Step Toward Sustainability (1992).
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individuals knew their own minds, society does not have the resources
to solicit opinions from everyone in every case. Moreover, individuals
would have every incentive to demand exaggerated compensation,
exploiting the need to secure their personal acceptance of a technology.
Indeed, the best informed individuals might also be the most
unreasonable. Even individuals who do not respond strategically may
have unreasonable demands for protection or unreasonable willingness
to accept risks. Finally, judgments that are not out of the ordinary may
still reflect concerns that are not appropriate bases for regulatory policy.
These considerations lead to this principle:
A technology is acceptable if it creates an acceptable
set of consequences for every member of society.
Compliance should be determined by applyin 'a
general evaluative standard to the best available
estimates of the technology's consequences. That
standard should express the values of individuals with
reasonable attitudes towards risk, constrained to focus
on legally relevant consequences, and allowed to
develop well-articulatedpositions.,
The next section elaborates on procedures that could be used for
implementation. They require basic research to determine general rules
of acceptability (with input from representative citizens and within
constraints set by regulations), followed by applied research to apply
them to specific circumstances. Such an objective determination of
subjective values is needed to protect individuals from being exploited
by society and society from being coerced by individuals.
Determining Acceptable Tradeoffs
Implementing a regulatory principle has two steps: developing
explicit general rules, thereby defining acceptable performance; and
applying those rules to specific technologies, thereby determining their
fate. All political-ethical-value questions should be resolved in the first
step, so that the second involves only technical application of rules. The
first requires political judgment to determine what kinds of tradeoffs
are acceptable; the second requires scientific judgment to estimate the

Fischhoff. Acceptable Risl AConceptual Proposal 17

risks and benefits of particular technologies with enough precision to
determine whether it meets the standard. The first step calls primarily
for input from the social sciences, for measuring citizens' general
attitudes toward risk-benefit tradeoffs. 3 1 The second calls for inputs
32
from various sciences, for measuring specific risks and benefits.
As with any practical procedures in a complex world, these will
require compromises to be implemented. The problems associated with
risk and benefit assessment are well known and debated. 3 3 They will
not be repeated here, except to note that they often produce estimates
of a variety of consequences (both good and bad), ranging over many
orders of magnitude (from the best to the worst), and are often
surrounded by considerable uncertainty (regarding both which
measures and which models to use). The general rules must apply to
tradeoffs among those kinds of outputs.
What follows is a conceptual analysis of how the development of
such standards could be organized. It proposes a procedure with three
stages: screening, balancing, and adjusting. The screening stage
establishes whether, for regulatory purposes, an individual is considered
to be exposed to risk from a technology (and would require some
compensating benefit). The balancing stage identifies acceptable
tradeoffs for exposed individuals. The adjusting stage incorporates
additional factors needed to ensure a credible regulatory process,
beyond what can be captured in summaries of risks and benefits.
31 The humanities might also pay a critical role in formulating possible tradeoff
rules, as inputs to the citizens entrusted with expressing public values (through the
best-available social-science procedure).
32 See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff, Setting Standards: A Systematic Approach to
Managing Public Health and Safety Risks, 30 Mgmt. Sci. 823 (1984).
3 See, e.g., Bentkover et al., supra note 11; Silvio 0. Funtowicz & Jeremy R.
Ravetz, Uncertainty and Quality in Science for Policy (1990); M. Granger Morgan &
Max Henrion, Uncertainty- A Guide to Dealing with Uncertainty in Quantitative
Risk and PolicyAnalysis (1990).
A recent interchange can be found in the Center for Risk Analysis discussion of
the Office of Management and Budget's critique of risk assessment procedures in the
federal government; see Office of Management and Budget, Current Regulatory
Issues in Risk Assessment and Risk Management (1990) and Center for Risk Analysis,
OMB vs. the Agencies: the Future of Cancer RiskAssessment (1991).
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A Measurement Philosophy
Two basic ways to get at people's values are observing their behavior
(revealed preferences) and asking them (expressed preferences). As
discussed below, the first method is limited unless one can identify the
perceptions and constraints that underlie an action. In many cases, it
will be extremely difficult to identify any action that clearly reflects
34
many critical tradeoffs.
As for the second, in principle, one can ask about anything. In
practice, though, the fact that we have questions need not mean that
our informants have answers. It is difficult to formulate precise value
questions, much less render them comprehensible and help people work
through the implications of their own preferences. 3 5 Although the
present proposal does no more than require directly facing questions
implicit in many risk decisions, these questions often make us uneasy.
Thus, it seems unrealistic to rely on standard survey methodology, with
its dispassionate interviewers presenting questions in a manner designed
to avoid any possible influence (or reactivity). Adopting that stance
with respondents who lack articulated views means capturing
fragmentary opinions and presenting them as deeply held true values. A
more appropriate strategy is to work with respondents, helping them to
understand issues and develop stable positions. It means striving to
balance biases, rather than trying to avoid them altogether. Although
unconventional in survey research, such a philosophy underlies decision
analysis. 3 6 Its procedures were created for situations with complex
34 See, e.g.,

Fischhoff & Cox, supra note 11; Fischhoff et al., supra note 27; and

Paul Slovic & Baruch Fischhoff, Targeting Risks: Comments on Wilde' "Theory of
Risk Homeostasis,"2 Risk Anal. 231(1983).
35 See, e.g., Fischhoff, supra note 15; Fischhoff & Furby, supra note 11; The
Origin of Values (Michael Hechter, Richard E. Mischod, & Lynn Nadel eds. 1993);

Robert C. Mitchell & Richard T. Carson, Using Surveys to Value Public Goods: The
Contingent Valuation Method (1989).
36 See, e.g., Ronald Howard, On Fates Comparable to Death, 30 Mgmt. Scl.
407 (1984); Howard Raiffa, Decision Analysis (1968); Stephen Watson & Denis
Buede, Decision Synthesis (1987); and Detlof von Winterfeldt & Ward Edwards,

Decision Analysis and Behavioral Research (1986).
An example of the sort of progress that might be made through a focused effort
to develop measurement techniques of the sort that can be found in recent studies of
attitudes toward fairness. See, e.g., C. Harvey, Decision Analysis Models for Social
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consequences and stakes sufficiently high to motivate individual
involvement. Surveys are sometimes depicted as mock elections
(opinion polls). The procedure required here might better be seen as
creating mock commissions or juries, with a random sample of citizens
impaneled to work things through on behalf of their peers.
Interviews would, logically, include an element of revealed
preferences, and would call upon people to reflect on their own prior
behavior and the reasons motivating it. Regarding risks that had
apparently been ignored, they could be, e.g., asked: Did they not care?
Did they have accurate perceptions? Would they make the same
decision again? Did they even think about their actions?
Although daunting, such elicitation need not be perfect. Applying
the acceptable-technology principle will lead to the same regulatory
decision for all tradeoffs within some range. If an elicitation procedure
shows that people's tradeoffs lie within that range, then that is all that
would be needed. The measurement techniques best suited to this task
37
seem to be those of decision analysis.
Screening
Clearly, people do not pay attention to all risks in their lives,
especially smaller ones. This has prompted many proposals for inferring
a de minimis level of risk. 3 8 According to these proposals, risks below
some level can be ignored when technologies are regulated.
Unfortunately, such proposals fail to ask (or at least determine)
whether people really do not care about risks they seemingly ignore. Do
Attitudes toward Equity, 21 Mgmt. Sc. 1199 (1985); Daniel Kahneman, Jack
Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on Profit-Seeking: Entitlements
in the Market, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 728 (1986); L. Robin Keller & Rakesh K. Sarin,
Equity in Social Risk: Some Empirical Observations, 8 Risk Anal. 135 (1988);
Barbara Mellers, Fair Allocations of Salaries and Taxes, 12 J. Exp. Psych.: Human
Percept. & Perf. 80 (1986).
37 See supra Howard; Watson & Buede and von Winterfeldt & Edwards.
38 See, e.g., Cyril L. Comar, Risk: A Pragmatic de minimis Approach, 203
Science 319 (1979); Joseph Fiskel, Toward a de minimus Policy in Risk Regulation, 5
RiskAnal. 257 (1985); Health & Safety Executive, supra note 1; Milvy, supra note
1; Jeryl Mumpower, An Analysis of the de minimis Strategy for Risk Management, 6
RiskAnal. 437 (1986); Gerald J. S. Wilde, A Theory of Risk Homeostasis, 2 Risk
Anal. 209 (1982).
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people even know they exist? If so, do they really know how great they
are? How much thought have they given to the issues? If particular risks
seem unacceptable, do people have any avenue, or energy, for
expressing concerns? If they accept a technology, is it because the risks
are negligible, or because there are compensating benefits? How
accurately do they perceive any benefits? Without answers to these
questions, no clear conclusions can be drawn from observed behavior.
Once the potential of revealed preference analyses has been
exhausted, expressed preferences would be explored. The critical
question for standard setting is: What risks are people willing to ignore,
so that no compensating benefit is required, if they are exposed to risks
at that level? This judgment should not consider the transaction costs of
either evaluating risks or collecting compensation. The agency
implementing the general standard would handle both. It would
commission (or review) the risk analyses. It would exact and allocate
39
any needed compensation, beyond what would occur naturally.
A successful screening procedure could dramatically reduce the
number of individuals whose welfare needs to be considered. Such
success might seem improbable in light of the observation that citizens
often seem very agitated by risks that many experts view as very small.
That suggests that no risk is so small that no compensation is required.
The problem with this inference is its simplistic interpretation of
citizens' behavior. They may not accept the experts' claims. Or, they
may object to the people and the political process managing the risk.
That is, they may feel that they are losing rights and respect, but be
constrained to talk about risks. Experts may prefer to call the public
stupid rather than to admit that they have treated it high handedly.

39 That is, where a technology does not inherently provide enough benefits to
compensate a group of citizens, it-could make direct transfers to them. Because the
acceptability of a technology depends on its net benefits (after transaction costs),
those who manage it would be motivated to find the most efficient allocation scheme,
for which the agency would be a likely vehicle.
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Balancing
Whenever a technology poses non-negligible risks to an individual,
it would then have to pass a risk-benefit test, showing that its
consequences are acceptable, as judged by the general standard set for
reasonable individuals. These standards can be developed with the same
kinds of procedures as are available for screening decisions:
* a. observing the preferences that may have been
revealed in past decisions,
* b. asking people in the abstract what tradeoffs
they deem acceptable,
* c. asking people to evaluate hypothetical
situations that embed abstract tradeoffs in concrete
examples, and
• d. asking people to review their own previous
decisions, clarifing the tradeoffs that those choices were
meant to embody.
Such research would need to provide not only its best estimate of these
value judgments, but also an assessment of its own definitiveness,
suitable for sensitivity analyses.
In reviewing past decisions, as in procedures a and d above, the
greatest credence would be given to cases fulfilling the conditions of
informed consent; that is, where the decision-making process was wellinformed, thoughtful, and uncoerced. Where people were uninformed
or misinformed (regarding risks or benefits), analysts must reconstruct
the decisions that people thought they were making. Where people
were unable to make thoughtful choices, analysts must divine which
choices would have emerged under more favorable circumstances.
Barriers to thoughtfulness include being rushed and simply not
knowing how to organize one's work. Although time pressure can
complicate decision making, poor choices are often made with all the
40
time in the world.
Actions, to be analyzed at all for evidence of people's values, need
to represent decisions, i.e., they need to reflect choices among
alternative courses of action. In the language of risk analysis, they need
40

See J. Frank Yates, Judgment and Decision Making (1989) and Yates, supra

note 24.
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to be voluntary. Deriving standards from involuntary decisions means
interpreting as acceptable whatever tradeoffs people have been forced to
accept. It means enshrining the injustices of the past in prescriptions for
the future.
Adjusting
No set of general rules will apply equally well in all circumstances.
To preserve the public credibility and political viability of an approach,
an agency must be able to adjust its determinations in situations having
crucial features that are not represented in its general rules. On the
other hand, if its work is not to become a patchwork of special
pleading, then it must attempt to codify those exceptions in advance.
Three examples follow, concerning the sort of systematic exceptions
that might be applied to the acceptable-technology principle:
- People want not only to receive attractive deals, but also to feel
that they have been treated fairly. Even if a technology provides them
with an acceptable risk-benefit tradeoff, people may be dissatisfied, for
example, if they feel that the technology's sponsors could have paid
them more without impairing the technology's economic viability.
They may be dissatisfied if a technology was located in their
community simply because it cost less to provide them with an
acceptable tradeoff than it would have cost to satisfy residents of a
wealthier community (who are accustomed to receiving more
compensation for any given level of risk). They may be dissatisfied if
they believe that others got a better deal than they did.4 1 These are
predictable, familiar human emotions. Whether they have standing
requires a regulatory determination. If they do, then the decisions
emerging from the screening and balancing stages might have to be
adjusted. For example, an agency might impose a "poverty premium,"
demanding higher compensation for risks in poorer communities. If
not, then the agency should be explicit about the irrelevance of these
42
issues.
41 See, e.g., Lita Furby, Psychology andJustice injustice in Views from the Social
Sciences 153 (Ronald L. Cohen ed. 1986); Kahneman, supra note 26 and Krimsky &

Plough, supra note 9. See also recent studies mentioned supra in note 36.
42 E.g., it could say "In setting standards for specific technologies, the agency
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• Citizens might be dissatisfied if the search for additional safety
stopped once a technology had been deemed acceptable - just as its
owners' might be dissatisfied if they were still required to incorporate
every new safety device. A compromise adjustment might be to require
additional safety measures that passed an explicit cost-effectiveness
criterion (e.g., reduced radiation exposure for less than $1,000 per
person-rem 4 3 ). Such a rule might reassure the public that there are
incentives for developing safety measures (insofar as the inventor of an
efficient risk-reduction method could expect to have it mandated),
without imposing an unreasonable burden on industry.
* The acceptable-technology principle is exclusively egoistic. In it,
individuals judge the acceptability of a technology solely by the risks
and benefits that they personally receive from it. However, people also
make sacrifices for the sake of others. For example, the neighbors of a
landfill might tolerate somewhat higher risk levels if the alternative was
shipping the waste to a developing country, or if they felt that this was
their part in a social process that ensured an orderly distribution of risk
burdens across the country. Assuming that some underlying order can
be discerned, altruistic adjustments might also be incorporated in the
44
standard.
Finally, of course, after screening and balancing, adjustment would
require legal or administrative mechanisms to integrate determinations
from this procedure with others that might be legally required.

cannot address issues of economic equality nor can it consider people's jealousy or
upset regarding their neighbors' fate - as long as they have been treated in
accordance with our general principles. If those feelings and inequities have any
standing, they would have to be addressed within the context of other federal policies,
such as income tax rates.

43 Supra note 5.
44 This is one possible way to represent concern for future generations. The obvious
alternative would be calculating the consequences for future individuals. As one got
very distant in time, both costs and benefits would often (but not always) become
vanishingly small, so that the computational load need not be overwhelming.
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Summary
The core of any safety determination is a value judgment defining
the "acceptability" of risk. In the approach proposed here, that
judgment is expressed in terms of a performance standard, specifying
risk-benefit tradeoffs that a technology must produce, rather than a
technical standard, specifying design and operation details. This
requires that performance be evaluated by individual citizens. Once
operational, it would involve a set of general rules for: screening cases,
to eliminate those where a technology poses a negligible risk; balancing
risks and benefits in the remaining cases, thereby characterizing
acceptable tradeoffs; and adjusting the balance statement to
accommodate additional factors.
Deriving such rules will require detailed analysis, using some
combination of the procedures outlined here. Some of these methods
rely on what people say about their values, whereas others rely on what
people actually do when their values are at stake. None are perfect. All
provide some complementary insights, assuming that their strengths
and weaknesses are understood. The more satisfactory their
implementation, the fewer issues will have to be addressed on an ad hoc
basis when the standard is applied. As mentioned, the product of
applying this procedure would be the point of departure for political
processes, wherein the affected parties struggle over the acceptance of
its recommendations. That is the fate of any regulatory decision. The
hope with this proposal is that the ensuing struggles will be fewer and
better focused, by virtue of embodying a principle that places
individual citizens' welfare at its core, provides industry with a
predictable standard and sensible incentives, and anticipates the major
exceptions.
Applying the Standard
Compared to existing approaches, a new approach has the
advantage of being unsullied by failures and compromises. Yet, it has
the disadvantage of having all the hard work of implementation in front
of it. Whether further elaboration is warranted depends on its promise.
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As an aid to appraising its promise, this section considers potential
challenges to its practicality and political acceptability.

Practicality
Perhaps the most obvious practical problem with this approach is
the apparent need to calculate risks and benefits separately for every
individual exposed to non-negligible risks (and to establish the
negligibility of the risks to everyone else). Where there are many such
individuals, this could require horrendous computation. Making it
manageable will require a structural analysis of how risks and benefits
are distributed. For example, the estimation process might begin with
the individuals bearing the greatest risk (to see if their benefits are
commensurate) 4 5 or with the individuals receiving the least benefit (to
see if their risks are non-commensurate). One then might look for
individuals experiencing intermediate levels of risk who receive
unusually low benefits, before considering individuals (or classes of
individuals) whose situations bear detailed analysis.
A common situation will be individuals who receive little risk and
little benefit from a technology. Very small risks may come from very
unlikely worst-case scenarios or from pollutants distributed widely at
very low concentrations. Very small benefits may come from diffuse
contributions to the overall economy. For example, a factory may everso-slightly reduce taxes or the threat of unemployment for individuals
living on the other side of town or state. Thus, the acceptability of the
technology for the vast majority of people will involve roughly the same
risk and benefit estimates. In some cases, applying the general rule will
yield so clear-cut a result that no refinements are needed. It may be
that the small benefit far outweighs the minimal risk, even for the most
averse (but still reasonable) individuals in that class. Or, the technology
may be so far out of line that a redesign or compensation plan is needed
before proceeding with the analysis.
All regulatory approaches must contend with uncertainties left by
even the best risk and benefit assessment methods. To be treated
45 This would be in keeping with EPA's practice of calculating risks to the
maximally exposed individual.
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systematically, uncertainties must be summarized quantitatively.
One can then determine whether a technology is in compliance, to any
desired degree of confidence (e.g., can one be 95% certain that the
benefits outweigh the risks?). A technology's impacts may be poorly

understood in an absolute sense, but still be well enough known to allow
a regulatory judgment. The level of confidence demanded would be
part of the general standard.
Uncertainties are often particularly large where risks and benefits are
particularly small. 4 7 Fortunately for the sake of the analysis, people
may demand less precision here than with more consequential
technologies. The screening procedure will show some risks to be
negligible, whereas others can be justified by any arguable benefits. If
so, a rough calculation of risk and benefit might be enough to
demonstrate acceptability with adequate confidence. Further work
might reveal other shortcuts that are scientifically and ethically
acceptable. For example, people might accept replacing person-byperson assessments with class-by-class assessments, especially if the
science was better at the aggregate level. Rather than estimating the
impacts for each individual residing ten to fifty miles from a factory,
one might estimate the total risks and benefits accruing to these
individuals, under the assumption that they bear roughly equal shares of
each.
PoliticalAcceptability
Ideally, a regulatory proposal would be evaluated solely in terms of
the general ethical principles that it embodies, its compliance with legal
constraints, and its practicality - and not in terms of the specific
decisions that it will produce. 4 8 To that end, the formulation of this
proposal has been motivated by the desire to address the principled
objections that can be raised against utilitarian philosophies (which
ignore distributional effects) and risk-only philosophies (which ignore
46 See, e.g., Funtowicz & Ravetz and Morgan & Henrion, supra note 33.
47 Consider, e.g., the controversies over threshold effects or indirect economic
impacts.
48 See, e.g., John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971).
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all other effects). It was hoped that this appeal would foster the patience
needed to work out its technical details.
Realistically, though, people will judge the procedure by how its
application will affect them personally. One possible defense against
such strategic behavior is to argue that regulatory processes are so
complex that it is hard to predict their outcomes. As a result, honesty is
the best policy when designing general procedures. If the principles
underlying a proposal are sound, then one should trust it to allow the
merits of one's position to emerge in specific applications. The
following paragraphs discuss what each of three groups of stakeholders
might find if it tried to project how this approach would affect its
vested interests.
For regulators, a working version of this proposal would make
regulatory operations more efficient, by reducing them to the routine
application of an accepted rule, and less controversial, by concentrating
political-ethical questions in the role-development process. Even failures
might be relatively productive, if the logical coherence of the approach
made it relatively easy to diagnose their sources. That might make it
easier for an agency to press legislators for a clearer mandate. On the
other hand, any change in procedure brings disruption, surprises, and
the need for a transition period.
For industry (or government, when it sponsors technologies), any
predictable, efficient process should reduce costs due to regulatory
delays and unpleasant surprises. Having to provide an acceptable
balance of consequences for all affected individuals is a rigorous
standard. However, it is also one that provides considerable design
freedom in achieving compliance (whether by increasing benefits or by
decreasing risks). The focus on individuals also offers a potential
solution to the recurrent problem of what to do when large numbers of
people receive small exposures, without resorting to de minimis
arguments like "they shouldn't mind a little risk" and without having to
choose among the competing models for estimating low-exposure risks.
People may agree to let a vague chance of a very small risk be balanced
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by a vague chance of a very small benefit - if the choice is made within
a generally credible procedure.
For citizens, the approach officially places the welfare of individuals
at the center of regulatory policy. It offers an explicit set of procedures,
open to review at both the standard-setting and standard-application
stages. It does, however, undermine the legitimacy of risk-only
standards which have sometimes been favored by public interest
advocates. Whether those advocates would oppose this proposal should
depend on whether they have promoted rigid risk standards primarily
as a strategic position, designed to manipulate regulatory processes that
are seen to underweight risks to the public. Recognizing both the risks
and the benefits of technologies, as proposed here, seems like a
reasonable compromise.
Conclusion
Orderly regulation requires well-specified, logically defensible
procedures. Without them, regulation is chaotic, unpredictable and
frustrating, with little promise of providing either the sort of protection
the public desires or the sort of stable environment that industry needs.
Within these goals, an approach has been developed that makes the
welfare of individual citizens the primary concern of regulatory
processes, while still providing industry with a clear, flexible, and
sensible set of requirements. A plan is sketched for putting this
conceptual proposal into practice. Details are necessarily sketchy and
merit elaboration only if the proposal seems practical enough and
political enough to offer the possibility of a more orderly and coherent
treatment of acceptability - a task that so far has defied our best
efforts, especially efforts attempting to specify a fixed level of
"acceptable risk."

